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The Incubus of Foreign Aid* 
Foreign aid enables the economy to grow fast by permitting a growth of 
investment which is more rapid than domestic saving will support. This is 
because a contribution of real resources on concessionary terms represents a real 
addition to total resources which can be used to promote development. A fast 
rate of economic growth leads to a higher level of domestic saving, which in turn 
makes the growth process more self-supporting. 
Pakistan has been cited as having used foreign aid effectively. Foreign 
aid has financed about 40 per cent of the increase in investment since 1960. This 
has enabled domestic investment to grow at a rate of about 15 per cent of the 
gross national product which is more rapid than the saving capacity of the 
country would have been able to support. At the same time, the savings rate 
has responded to this acceleration in the rate of economic growth and is now 
about 10 per cent of the gross national product, as compared with only 5 to 6 
per cent of the gross national product in 1955. Thus, foreign-aid inflow has been 
'productive' in Pakistan in the sense that it has made the economy grow much 
faster than it could have done otherwise. 
However, foreign aid-financed growth has not been an unmixed blessing 
for Pakistan. For, as growth is a long-term problem, long periods of borrowing 
and a high level of debt and debt service can hardly be avoided. While capital 
inflow is net addition to domestic resources, foreign borrowing continues for a 
longer period because domestic savings are still insufficient to pay both for 
domestic investment requirements and debt service on past loans. The econo-
my has been saddled with large foreign debt-servicing liabilities which, up to 
1965-66, amounted to Rs. 1,413 million and formed 8.4 per cent of Pakistan's 
total foreign-exchange earnings. As a result, net accumulated debt stood at 
Rs. 6,842.8 million in December 1965 and formed 15 per cent of gross national 
product. Already, in 1969-70, Pakistan's debt-servicing liabilities had increased 
to 19 per cent of total foreign-exchange earnings, while total net debt stood at 
Rs. 14,080.1 million and formed 25.9 per cent of the G.N.P. This strain on the 
economy and the country's balance of payments will become gradually more 
severe as interest and amortisation charges grow at a compound rate. 
*This essay is based on an earlier study by the author [5], The author wishes to 
acknowledge his indebtedness to all the participants in IEA's Conference held in Kandy, Ceylon, 
in 1969. 
The magnitude of the problem that Pakistan faces in the not-too-distant 
future can be appreciated by the fact that resource outflow on account of interest 
payments on past loans alone will already be greater than the net resource inflow 
by 1980 (see Appendix A). In other words, from 1980 onwards, foreign re-
sources will be required just to pay interest on past loans, and their effective 
contribution to domestic resources will have dwindled down to zero. Further-
more, net debt will be about 72 per cent of G.N.P. by 1985. It follows that, given 
the terms on which foreign capital is obtained (i.e. the rates of interest and 
amortisation), the economy must be able to save an increasing proportion of 
additional income in order to avoid the sure prospects of economic bank-
ruptcy and achieve the much-cherished goal of an early "independence" from 
foreign aid. 
Apart from the mounting burden of debt servicing and repayment, the 
contribution of foreign aid to development has been seriously eroded by the 
various conditions put by the donor countries on the use of the resources and for 
repayment. These conditions — e.g., the tying of aid by sources of supply — 
create a wedge between the nominal aid flows and their real value to the recipients. 
On top of all this, there has been a growing disenchantment with economic assis-
tance in the donor countries for reasons ranging from the more pressing domes-
tic problems to the allegedly poor economic performance of the developing 
countries. As a result, the nominal amounts of aid have been falling over time 
while their real value has fallen still further. The immediate implication of 
this decline in foreign aid flows is that developing countries like Pakistan will 
have to dig deeper in their already meagre foreign-exchange resources to meet 
their debt-servicing and repayment obligations instead of doing this out of 
increments in foreign-aid flows. 
Thanks to all these considerations, the dependence on foreign assistance 
must end by a finite period. Other motives like national self-respect also point 
in the same direction. As a matter of fact, all foreign-aid models stipulate a 
definite ending of the inflow of foreign borrowings. Pakistan's perspective plan 
(1965-85), prepared by the Planning Commission [6], aims at substantially 
reducing Pakistan's dependence on 'external resources' by closing the saving-
investment (or equivalently the export-import gap) by 1985. However, the 
Planning Commission's estimates refer only to net capital inflow and neglect 
the extra foreign borrowing that would be required to pay for service payments 
on previously incurred debt. Anisur Rahman [7] has made estimates of 
Pakistan's foreign-debt liability implicit in the Planning Commission's esti-
mates of net resource inflow (loosely termed as 'external resources' in the 
perspective plan). The purpose of this essay is to present fresh estimates 
up to 1985 of Pakistan's requirements of foreign capital and of the external 
debt liabilities that such capital inflow will impose on the economy by employ-
ing a modified capital inflow-debt service model. 
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The discussion in this essay is divided into four main sections. In the 
first section we attempt to provide definitions of the basic concepts used in this 
paper, since much of the confusion in the discussion of foreign assistance has 
stemmed from semantic ambiguities. In the second section are presented 
estimates of net capital inflows required to (nearly) fill up the saving-investment 
gap, while section three gives estimates of external debt liabilities that such 
capital inflows will entail. Section four concludes this discussion. 
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I. D E F I N I T I O N S 
Before we present our basic estimates it may be useful to be clear about 
the definitions of the terms we use in this study. To begin with, foreign aid 
consists of an explicit transfer of resources to less-developed on concessionary 
terms [2]. Thus, business transaction, private trade and capital movement 
are not foreign aid since the resources so transferred are not provided on con-
cessionary terms. Likewise, a concessionary implicit transfer of resources occa-
sioned by special import quotas and preferential tariffs accorded the imports 
from developing countries — e.g., such as advocated in the UNCTAD meet-
ings — cannot be defined as foreign aid even though such arrangements imply a 
very definite addition to the purchasing power of the developing countries. 
In order to avoid these ambiguities in the concept of foreign aid, we 
have used in this study two basic concepts, 'net resource inflow' and 'net 
borrowing', for clarity of analysis. Net resource inflow has been defined as 
F„ = I „ - S n (1) 
where F, I and S stand for net resource inflow, domestic investment and 
domestic saving respectively. In words, net resource inflow is the difference 
between domestic saving and investment1. This definition assumes that all 
foreign assistance takes the form of grants. However, most of the foreign 
assistance in Pakistan has been in the form of loans on which interest has to 
be paid. Hence, total foreign assistance equals net resource inflow plus interest 
on net debt in the previous year. This magnitude is defined as 'net borrowing' 
and is given by 
B„ = I„ - Sn + i»-i-J Y Fj (2) j - i 
n—I 
where £ Fj is the net debt of the previous year and i is the average rate of 
j=i 
interest. Furthermore, loans must also be repaid, which means that total 
borrowing is equal to net borrowing plus amortisation charges on the net debt 
of the previous year. In symbols, 
Bg = Bn + a n s Fj (3) 
j - i 
where Bg and a stand for gross borrowing and rate of amortisation, respectively. 
1 Alternatively, we could define net resource inflow as the difference between total 
exports and total imports, i.e., F = M — X, where M and X stand for imports and exports, res-
pectively. < These two definitions are actually equivalent in an ex post sense, since Y —• E = 
I — S = M — X, by definition, where Y and E stand for national income and national expen-
diture, respectively,see Balassa [2], 
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It may be noted that these distinctions between the above-noted concepts 
are not mere semantic differences. For, the concept of 'net resource inflow' is 
most relevant when we are concerned with the net contribution that foreign 
capital resources make to economic growth by supplementing domestic invest-
ment resources. On the contrary, when we are interested in analysing the 
balance-of-payments implications of a given foreign-assistance programme, then 
'net borrowing' is the most relevant concept. It is important to distinguish 
between these concepts as a confusion between them can lead to faulty analysis. 
For instance, in Pakistan's perspective plan the estimates of 'external resources' 
must be interpreted as estimates only of 'net resource inflows' required to fill the 
so-called 'saving-investment gap' (or equivalently, the 'export-import gap'), 
because these estimates do not include foreign borrowing required to pay 
interest on past debt. The concept of gross borrowing highlights the basic 
impoitance that attaches to the terms of repayment. If, as is the case, a parti-
cular value of net borrowing is contemplated in order to fill the saving-invest-
ment gap and to service the debt, the volume of gross borrowing will be 
progressively large as debt-service payments have to be made2. 
2The converse is also true: if a particular volume of gross borrowing is contemplated, the 
volume of net borrowing will be progressively less as debt-service payments have to be made. 
5 
II . E S T I M A T E S O F N E T R E S O U R C E I N F L O W S D U R I N G 1965-85 
We have used a modified version of the Avramovic's debt-model3 in 
order to find out the time path of the net resource inflows up to 1985, the 
terminal year of the perspective plan. The net resource inflow in the year n 
is defined as4 
F„ = In • 
= k(Yn + I - Y„) — [S0 Y „ _ t + s' (Yn - Yn_j)] 
= kiYn - [S0Y„_r + s'Yn_! r] (4) 
where 
Y = gross national product 
F = net resource inflow 
I = domestic investment 
S = domestic saving 
k = marginal capital-output ratio 
r = the rate of growth of G.N.P. 
S0 = gross domestic savings ratio 
s' = marginal savings ratio 
It can be readily seen that for net resource inflow untimately to decline 
— i.e. for F n < F0 — /) MRS > ARS, and ii) kr < s' (see Appendix 
B-l). In words, the marginal rate of saving must exceed both the average rate of 
savings and the product of the capital-output ratio and the rate of growth of 
the gross national product, which is the rate of investment. 
We have made the assumptions shown in Table I in estimating the 
magnitude of net resource inflow up to 1985. 
3 An important shared property of the two models is that the length of the debt cycle 
generated by external borrowing to cover the saving-investment gap is highly sensitive to the 
marginal rate of saving assumed and to the extent of the initial gap itself. This is because the 
stock of debt would grow rapidly if the gap were large, and because the larger the accumulated 
debt relative to national income, the higher would be the marginal rate of saving required by 
the economy to meet both its own investment requirements and its debt-servicing obligations. 
This point was clarified by K. N . Ra j during the Conference, see [5], 
4The saving-investment gap in year n is usually defined as 
k(Yn+l — Y n )— [SoYo + s' (Y„ — Yo)] 
where both the average and marginal savings are defined in relation to the base-year income 
(Yo). See, for instance, Avramovic [1] and Mikesell [4], In contrast, we have defined both 
these magnitudes in relation to the previous year's national income (Yn—l). The reason for this 
modification is that, on the previous definition, the economy tends to save much more than is 
reasonable to expect in the case of a developing country like Pakistan. As a result, the saving-
investment gap closes much too early, around 1975, which is a highly improbable result even on 
the most optimistic assumptions. 
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TABLE HI 
THE KEY ASSUMPTIONS O F NET RESOURCE I N F L O W REQUIREMENTS 
PROJECTIONS FOR 1965-85 
Annual 
compound 
rate of 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 growth (in percentage 
terms) 
1965-85 
1. GNP growth* 5;2 6.5 7.3 7.5 7.5 7.2 
2. Marginal rate of 
saving (per cent)* 22 22 25 28 25 25 
3. Average rate of 
saving* 10.3 13.6 16.9 20.2 21.8 
4. Capital-output ratio 
(gross)* 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.9 
*In the precedin 3 five years. 
It may be noted that these are in fact the assumptions of Pakistan's per-
spective plan (1965-85). We have taken theee assumptions in order to make 
our results comparable with those of the perspective plan. Also, these assu.mp-
tions are in the nature of policy directives which the economic analyst must take 
as given. Furthermore, we have made our calculations, as the Planning Com-
mission have done on the basis of the 1965 G.N.P. figures. The main results 
of our exercise are reproduced in Table II. 
TABLE II 
PAKISTAN'S REQUIREMENTS O F NET RESOURCE I N F L O W DURING 1965-85 
(in million rupees) 
Annual 
compound 
rate of 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 growth (in percentage 
terms) 
1965-85 
1. GNP at 1964-65 45,540.0 62,393.8 88,744.2 127,403.7 182,904.5 7.2 
(market price) 
2. Gross investment 9,142.3* 13,208.6 19,301.8 27,710.4 41,153.4 8.3** 
3. Gross domestic 
saving 5,341.8* 8,919.7 15,667.9 26,162.3 40,281.5 11.2** 
4. Net resource inflow 
[ = (2) —- (3)] 3,800.5* 4,288.9 3,633.9 1,548.1 871.9 ,-j 
5. (4) as percentage of 
GNP 7.8 6.9 4.1 1.2 0.5 
*Figures are for 1966. See Appendix A for details. 
**Growth rates for nineteen years only. 
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It can be seen from row 4 that / / the G.N.P. grows at the target rate of 
7.2 per cent, and if the economy succeeds in saving 25 per cent of additional 
income and the capital-output ratio is 2.9:1, then Pakistan's dependence on net 
resource inflow can be substantially reduced from 7.8 per cent of G.N.P. in 1966 
to 0.5 per cent of G.N.P. in 1985. In the meantime domestic investment will 
have increased from 18.2 per cent of G.N.P. in 1965 to 22.5 per cent of G.N.P. 
in 1985; and domestic saving will have risen from 11.0 per cent of G.N.P. in 
1965 to 22.0 per cent of G.N.P. in 1985. However, it may be noted that our 
estimates of net resource inflow promise an earlier filling-up of the saving-
investment gap than do the Planning Commission estimates: whereas according 
to our estimates net resource inflow in 1985 will have been reduced to 0.5 per 
cent of G.N.P., the Planning Commission estimates put it at 1.1 per cent of 
G.N.P. Since we do not know their method of calculation, it is difficult to 
explain this difference. (Recall that the values of 'key' parameters are the same 
in both the estimates. Also, both estimates start from the base-year G.N.P. 
figures, Rs. 45,540 million.) At any rate, this difference in the magnitude of net 
resource inflow in the two estimates is not of great significance for foreign-aid 
policy. 
8 
III. E S T I M A T E S O F P A K I S T A N ' S E X T E R N A L I N D E B T E D N E S S 
D U R I N G 1965-85 
The estimates of net resource inflow that have been presented in the 
preceding section give an idea only of the magnitude of the net resource inflow 
required over a number of years to close the saving-investment gap. However, 
these estimates should not be taken to signify, as Pakistan's Planning Com-
mission appear to be doing, independence from 'external resources'. For, as 
foreign capital comes in the form of loans, interest and amortisation charges must 
be paid on the accumulated debt. Since debt-service liabilities must be met 
for a considerable period of time by new borrowing, the estimates of net resource 
inflow are considerably less than Pakistan's total requirements of foreign borrow-
ings. For this reason we have made estimates of net borrowing, gross borrow-
ing and net debt. These estimates have been generated within the framework of 
our model. 
Estimates of Net Borrowing: The estimates of net borrowing, as indicated 
above, are given by 
B„ = I„ + S„ + FJ (4) 
j=i 
n—I 
where i is interest rate and 2 Fj is the net debt in the year n—-1. The 
j = i 
conditions for net borrowing to decline are, as it turns out, the same as those 
necessary to make net resource inflow decline, i.e. i) MRS > ARS and 
//) MRS > kr. (The proof of this is given in Appendix B-2.) However, the 
period after which net borrowing does in fact decline depends on the rate of 
interest: the lower the rate of interest, the earlier will 'independence' from net 
borrowing be achieved, if the above-stated conditions are satisfied. 
We have estimated Pakistan's requirements for 'net borrowing' up to 
1985. In order to calculate interest payments on net debt outstanding in 1965, 
we have used an average interest rate of 3.9 per c e n t s . The results of our exer-
cise are reproduced in Table TIL 
'According to a recent study (unpublished) made by the Planning Commission, 52 per 
cent of all loans contracted up to 1965 carried an interest charge of 3 per cent; 41 per cent of all 
loans an interest charge of over 5 per cent; and the rest of the 7 per cent of all loans carry an 
interest charge between 3 and 5 per cent. This gives an average of 3.9 per cent. 
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TABLE HI 
PAKISTAN'S REQUIREMENTS OF NET BORROWING FOR 1965-85 
(jn million rupees) 
Net 
borrowings 
As per cent of 
G.N.P. 
1966 4,067.4 8.4 
1970 5,290.3 8.5 
1975 5,878.1 6.6 
1980 5,147.1 4.1 
1985 5,795.9 3.2 
See Appendix A for details. 
These figures show that Pakistan's requirements of net borrowing will 
have increased from Rs. 4,067.4 million in 1966 to Rs. 5,795.9 million in 1985 at 
a compound rate of 4.1 per cent per annum over the twenty-year period. 
Pakistan's domestic saving will need to be supplemented by foreign capital only 
to the extent of 0.5 per cent of G.N.P. by 1985. As a result, Pakistan's balance 
of payments will have to bear an increasing burden of debt-service payments for 
a considerably longer period of time. However, it will be noted that, while the 
net borrowing will have increased in absolute terms, it will have declined as a 
percentage of gross national product — from 8.4 per cent in 1965 to 3.2 per cent 
in 1985—reflecting the fact that G.N.P. over the same period will have grown 
at a compound rate of 7.2 per cent per annum. This in turn reflects a 
greater 'readiness' of the economy to take the burden of debt-service 
payments. 
Estimates of Net Debt: The increase in debt-service payments will have 
also increased Pakistan's net debt, constituting a net drain (net of debt repay-
ments) on domestic resources; and complete independence from foreign 
assistance will have been achieved only when the entire outstanding debt is 
extinguished. For this reason, we have estimated the increase in net debt up 
to 1985. These estimates have been obtained simply by adding net borrowings 
of a given year to the net debt outstanding in the previous year. Our results 
are repfoduced in Table IV. 
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TABLE HI 
ESTIMATES O F PAKISTAN'S NET INDEBTEDNESS AND THE BURDEN O F 
DEBT DURING 1965-85 
(in million rupees) 
Net Per cent of 
indebtedness GNP 
1965 6,842.8* 15.0 
1970 30,966.3 49.6 
1975 63,421.9 71.5 
1980 97,428.0 76.5 
1985 132,052.3 ' 72.2 
*Actual net debt outstanding at the end of 1965. See Appendix A for details . 
The figues show that Pakistan will have accumulated a large net debt by 
1985. Not only will the absolute net debt have increased, but the net burden of 
foreign debt (net debt as percentage of national income) will also have increased 
by 1985: from 15 per cent of G.N.P. in 1965 net debt will have increased to 72.2 
per cent of G.N.P. in 1985. This large increase in the proportion of net debt 
will have occurred because it has grown at a compound rate of about 15.9 per 
cent per annum, as compared with 7.2 per cent compound growth rate of 
G.N.P. These are large figures and give an idea of the magnitude of the debt 
legacy the present generation will have left for posterity. 
Estimates of Gross Borrowing: So far we have not considered the repay-
ment of loans. Not only interest charges but amortisation payments must also 
be made on past loans. Amortisation payments plus net borrowing give the 
figure for gross borrowings. It has been defined in Section I as 
B , = B» + a ' s ' F j (5) 
i = i 
The concept of gross borrowing, though not significant for economic analysis 
once amortisation payments are fixed, is important for aid policy in that it high-
lights the crucial significance of the length of the period of repayments. For, 
given the rate of interest, the longer the period of repayment, the lower will be 
the amortisation payments and the smaller will be the gross borrowing required 
to maintain a given volume of net borrowing. For this reason, we have made 
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estimates of gross borrowing for 1965-85. An amortisation rale of 3.9 per cent 
(equal to the average rate of interest) has been assumed, since total debt-service 
payments so far have been devoted to pay interest and amortisation charges on 
a 50:50 basis. Our estimates are presented in Table V. 
TABLE V 
ESTIMATES OF GROSS BORROWING FOR 1965-85 
(value in million rupees) 
Gorss 
borrowing 
Net 
borrowing 
1965 4,334.3 4,067.4 
1970 6,291.7 5,290.3 
1975 8,122.3 5,878.1 
1980 8,746.1 5,147.1 
1985 10,719.9 5,795.9 
Annual compound rates of 
growth (percentage terms) 4.9 1.9 
See Appendix A for details. 
These figures show that, given the terms of repayment, Pakistan will have 
to borrow in 1985 Rs. 10,719.9 million in order to ensure that Rs. 5,795.9 worth 
of foreign resources do in fact flow in to sustain the stipulated rate of growth of 
G.N.P. and to pay the interest charges on net debt. Also, when compared with 
the corresponding magnitudes in 1965, gross borrowings will have increased 
faster than net borrowings; i.e. whereas during 1965-85 net borrowings will 
have increased at a compound rate of 1.9 per cent per annum, gross borrowings 
will have increased at a rate of 4.9 per cent per annum. Thus, Pakistan will have 
to borrow in gross terms more in 1985 than in 1965 in order to ensure the 
'required' amount of net borrowing. The implication of this for aid 
policy is clear. The aim of the aid negotiators, given the rate of interest, 
should be to narrow down this differential between the growth rates of gross 
borrowings and net borrowings. This can be done by negotiating for lower 
amortisation payments, which means that the period of repayment will become 
longer". However, such a policy means that the day of 'independence' from 
foreign aid will be pushed farther into the future. 
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I V . C O N C L U S I O N S 
In this essay we have made an attempt, by employing a modified version 
of Avramovic's capital inflow-debt service model, to provide estimates of net 
capital inflows that Pakistan will require over a number of years in order to close 
the gap between domestic saving and investment. We have shown that capital 
inflows of such magnitude impose large debt-servicing liabilities on the 
economy and leave a legacy of a large net debt for posterity. 
Our estimates present an alarming picture of debt liabilities. Firstly, 
it has been shown that despite low rates of interest (3.9 per cent) and of repay-
ment (seventeen years) and of a relatively optimistic rate of economic growth 
(7.2 per cent per annum) postulated in this study, foreign debt builds up to a 
level of over 70 per cent of national income by 1985! There was, of course, no 
reason to be worried about the size of the debt simply because it was a high 
percentage of national income or to assume that it would all have to be repaid; 
a developing country's debt and capital stock could both go on growing like they 
do in a successful corporation. But in the real world in which uncertainty is 
crucial, it is important to see the problem in terms of the developing country's 
'balance sheet' taking into account the complexities introduced by equity capital 
(which can be repatriated at any time) as a form of 'aid', short-term loans and 
related 'hot-money' flows, limited foreign exchange resources and so on. The 
sort of difficulties that even a high-saving developing country could run into has 
been well-illustrated by Brazil's experience, since 1950, of the consequences — in 
sudden repatriations, devaluations and so on — of low international confidence, 
even when coupled with a comparatively low debt. 
Secondly, on the basis of past trends, even if there were no debt amortisa-
tion, interest charges for Pakistan will have outpaced net receipts by 1980. 
Thirdly, even though net borrowing will decline as a percentage of GNP, this 
should not make us complacent about the future. For, debt must also be 
amortized and this makes the magnitude of gross borrowing so crucial for aid 
policy. We have shown above that Pakistan will have to borrow more in gross 
terms in 1985 than now. 
It follows that the Government has been contracting a debt-servicing 
liability that future generations could not possibly finance from domestic re-
sources. Private foreign investment at the moment is negligible addition to these 
resources, and it promises to remain so. Is Government morally justified in 
burdening the posterity to this extent? After all the government must ensure 
equality between the present and the future generations. We cannot duck the 
issue simply by throwing our hands in the air and say 'but what else can we do'. 
For, a capital inflow of this order would be unnecessary if we attacked the import-
export gap seriously — by tightening controls on consumer imports and by shift-
ing industry's import coefficients through developing an indigenous technology 
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based on indigenous resources and a technology-oriented educational structure. 
As for the savings-investment gap, there is some evidence to show that aid and 
domestic savings are inversely related. Of course, it would be naive to think 
that a contraction in aid flows would automatically shake investible funds from 
the economy. But it is equally naive to believe that savings are a function of 
income alone. In practice, a lot is decided in Planning Commission in terms of 
some sort of calculus which, while it values oligarchic resistance, also values 
total resources. If one source of savings falls away, the planners would look 
very hard for another. In Pakistan, they might well find them in the urban 
sector where savings account for 8-9 per cent of income compared with 12-13 
per cent in the rural sector. Besides, competition between the countries of the 
region is such that any drop in the rate of growth as a result of the withdrawal 
of aid would be unacceptable. 
The moral is that successful negotiation of aid should not always be 
celebrated as an event of immense rejoicing. Our traditional euphoria on such 
occasions must be replaced by sober thought. For, we could really plunge the 
economy right into the morass of bankruptcy if we do not spend the foreign aid 
funds even more wisely than our own. We must be careful enough to boost 
up our foreign exchange earnings along the way. Furthermore, a high marginal 
savings rate must be attained in order to fill in the saving-investment gap and to 
pay for debt-servicing charges. Of course, debt servicing can be paid for by new 
borrowing, and it will in fact be inevitable to do this to some extent, but such a 
strategy will lead to a rapid accumulation of net debt. However, while 
domestic savings must grow, there are definite limits to what the economy can 
be forced to save. Hence, part of the solution of the problem of external 
indebtedness will inevitably have to be provided by the donor countries who 
must be prepared to provide loans at lower interest rates and on easier terms of 
repayment. For, such a policy would not only lengthen the period of net trans-
fer of resources and make their aggregate value larger, it will also make it 
possible for the economy to achieve independence from foreign assistance 
without imposing too heavy a 'consumption' cost on the domestic consumer. 
However, in the last analysis, the responsibility for wise housekeeping is our 
own. While we must try to make the donors see reason, we should be the ones 
to see it in the first place. 
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Appendix A 
FOREIGN AID REQUIREMENTS FOR PAKISTAN'S LONG-TERM GROWTH (1965-85): 
THE SAVING-INVESTMENT GAP APPROACH 
Year G.N.P. 
(Yn) 
Yn—i Y„ v v 1 N 1 II — I 
Investment 
I„=k(Y„_i 
YN) 
G.D.S.R. 
x Y n _ : 
M.S.R. 
x(4) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1965 45,540.0 2,960.1 — . 5,288.3 . , . 
1966 48,500.1 3,152.5 2,960.1 9,142.3 4,690.6 651.2 
1967 51,652.6 3,357.4 3,152.5 9,736.5 4,995.5 693.6 
1968 55,010.0 3,575.7 3,357.4 10,369.5 5,320.2 738.6 
1969 58,585.7 3,808.1 3,575.7 11,043.5 5,666.0 786.7 
1970 62,393.8 4,554.7 3,808.1 13,208.6 7,967.7 952.0 
1971 66,948.5 4,887.3 4,554.3 14,194.2 8,485.6 1,138.7 
1972 71,835.8 5,244.0 4,887.3 15,207.6 9,105.0 1,221.8 
1973 77,079.8 5,626.8 5,244.0 16,319.1 9,769.7 1,311.0 
1974 82,706.6 6,037.6 17,509.0 17,509.0 10,482.9 1,406.7 
1975 88,744.2 6,655.8 6,037.6 19,301.8 13,977.4 1,600.9 
1976 95,400.0 7,155.0 6,655.8 20,749.5 14,997.8 1,863.9 
1977 102,555.0 7,691.6 7,150.0 22,305.6 16,122.6 2,003.4 
1978 110,246.6 8,268.5 7,691.6 23,978.7 17,331.8 2,153.6 
1979 118,515.1 8,888.6 8,268.5 25,776.9 18,631.7 2,315.2 
1980 127,403.7 9,555.3 8,888.6 27,610.4 23,940.1 2,222.2 
1981 136,959.0 10,271.9 9,555.3 30,815.7 25,735.5 2,388.8 
1982 147,230.9 11,042.3 10,271.9 33,126.9 27,665.7 2,568.0 
1983 158,273.2 11,870.5 11,042.3 35,611.5 29,740.6 2,760.6 
1984 170,143.7 12,760.8 11,870.5 38,282.4 31,971.2 2,967.6 
1985 182,904.5 13,717.8 12,760.8 41,153.4 37,091.3 3,190.2 
G.D.S.R. = Gross domestic saving ratio. 
M.S.R. = Marginal saving ratio. 
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Savings 
S„=(6 )+ 
(7) 
Net 
resource 
inflow 
(5)—(8) 
Interest 
at 3.9% 
Amortiza-
tion at 
3.9% 
Net 
borrowing 
(9)+ (10) 
Gross 
borrowing 
(11)+(12) 
Net 
debt 
(12) 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
. . — , — 6,842.8* 
5,341.8 3,800.5 266.9 266.9 4,067.4 4,334.3 10,910.2 
5,689.1 4,047.4 425.5 425.5 4,472.9 4,898.4 15,383.1 
6,058.8 4,310.7 599.9 599.9 4,910.6 5,510.5 20,293.7 
6,452.7 4.590.8 791.5 791.5 5,382.3 6,173.8 25,676.0 
8,919.7 4,288.9 1.001.4 1,001.4 5,290.3 6,292.7 30,966.3 
9,624.3 4.559.9 1,207.7 1,207.7 5,777.6 6,985.3 36,743.9 
10,226.8 4.880.8 1,433.0 1,433.0 6,313.8 7,746.8 43,057.7 
11,080.7 5,238.4 1,679.3 1,679.3 6,917.7 8,597.0 49,975.4 
11,889.6 5,619.4 1.949.0 1,949.0 7,568.4 9,517.4 57,543.8 
15,667.9 3,533.9 2.244.2 2,244.2 5,878.1 8,122.3 63,421.9 
16,861.7 3,887.8 2,473.5 2,473.5 6,351.3 8,834.8 69,783.2 
18,126.0 4,179.6 2,721.5 2,721.5 6,901.1 9,622.6 76,684.3 
19,485.6 4,493.3 2.990.7 2,990.7 7,484.0 10,474.7 84,168.3 
20,946.9 4,830.0 3.282.6 3,282.6 8,112.6 11,395.2 92,280.9 
26,162.2 1,548.1 3,599.0 3,599.0 5,147.1 8,746.1 97,428.0 
28,124.3 2,691.4 3,799.7 3,799.7 6,491.1 10,290.8 103.919.1 
30,233.7 2,893.2 4,052.8 4,052.8 6,946.0 10,998.8 110,875.1 
32,501.2 3,110.3 4,323.7 4,323.7 7,434.0 1,757.7 118,299.1 
34,938.8 3,343.6 4,613.7 4,613.7 7,957.3 12,571.0 126.256.4 
40,281.5 871.9 4,924.0 4,924.0 5,795.9 10,719.9 132,052.3 
*Debt outstanding at the end of 1965. 
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